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One of the least-studied revolts in post-colonial Africa, the 
invasion of Niger in 1964 by guerrillas of the outlawed 
Sawaba party was a dismal failure and culminated in a 
failed attempt on the life of President Diori in the spring of 
1965. Personal aspirations for higher education, access to 
jobs and social advancement, probably constituted the 
driving force of Sawaba’s rank and file. Lured by the party 
leader, Djibo Bakary, with promises of scholarships abroad, 
they went to the far corners of the world, for what turned out 
to be guerrilla training. The leadership’s motivations were 
grounded in a personal desire for political power, justified 
by a cocktail of militant nationalism, Marxism-Leninism and 
Maoist beliefs. Sawaba, however, failed to grasp the 
weakness of its domestic support base. The mystifying 
dimensions of revolutionary ideologies may have 
encouraged Djibo to ignore the facts on the ground and 
order his foot soldiers to march to their deaths. 
 
This chapter attempts to reconstruct a neglected episode in the post-colonial 
history of Niger. It focuses on an abortive invasion of this West African country 
in the autumn of 1964 by members of a clandestine political party, Sawaba. On 
the orders of their leader-in-exile, Djibo Bakary, armed commandos infiltrated 
Niger and tried to instigate a popular insurrection against the regime of 
President Hamani Diori and his ruling Parti Progressiste Nigérienne (PPN). 
Despite elaborate preparations, the commandos were caught completely off 
guard by the hostile reception they received from the peasant population and the 
government had little trouble in rounding them up with the assistance of the 
peasantry. By the end of November 1964, barely two months after the invasion, 
the Sawaba commandos had been routed. A dozen men had been killed, several 
were wounded and more than a hundred taken prisoner, while the rest had fled 
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across the border. Several activists faced the death penalty or long terms of 
imprisonment. In April 1965, a last attempt was made to oust Niger’s 
government, when a young Sawabist tried to assassinate the president. The 
attempt failed as dismally as the autumn revolt the year before and marked 
Sawaba’s definitive exile into the political wilderness. 
The main interest of this episode, on which no scholarly research has ever 
been undertaken, derives from the insight it provides into a bitter power struggle 
between two rival political forces. The underlying cause was, at least ostensibly, 
the search for an ideological foundation and definition of the legitimacy of the 
new, post-colonial polity. The revolt1 and its failure also involved certain other 
dimensions that make it of more than a passing interest to observers of Africa’s 
past and contemporary politics. 
This chapter argues that, despite the existence of regional, if not ethnic, 
cleavages and rivalries, the insurrection was caused by various factors, and 
regional tensions were probably only contextual. Since Niger’s independence, its 
politics have to some extent been affected by regional fault lines that have set 
different regions and communities against each other. The principal fault line is 
the competition between the eastern parts of Niger, inhabited by Hausa-speaking 
communities, and the western regions of the country that are dominated by 
Zerma- and Songhai-speaking groups. While the groundnut-producing areas of 
the east constituted the main source of the country’s national income at 
independence, it was the western Zerma and Songhai groups that took control of 
Niger’s political system. 
Nevertheless, social-generational competition may have been a more 
important aspect in the revolt, as this set younger people – Hausa as well as non-
Hausa – apart from an older generation of Nigeriens who either belonged to 
Hausaland’s chiefly class or had monopolized the country’s public life and 
assumed control of the limited numbers of jobs and benefits. Part of Sawaba’s 
support base in the late 1950s was thus made up of relatively young men, some 
of Hausa origin and in particular, recent immigrants to Niger’s emergent urban 
areas. Many were traders, transporters or members of Muslim brotherhoods – 
such as the Tijaniyya – and retained links with their home region. As the most 
mobile and economically active members of their community, they resented the 
domination of Hausa society by the (neo)traditional canton chiefs or Sarkis – 
conservative elements whose interests did not necessarily coincide with those of 
the younger generation. Many youngsters, Hausas and non-Hausas alike, wanted 
access to modern education or aspired to wealth and new positions in society, 
                                                 
1 The terms ‘revolt’, ‘rebellion’ and ‘insurrection’ are used interchangeably here. The 
concept of ‘invasion’ points to the mode of, and the external-spatial dimension to, the 
rebellion. 
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which neither the Hausa chiefly class nor Niger’s state elite would provide. 
Sawaba’s appeal, in this context, stemmed not only from the more militant strain 
of African nationalism that it professed, but probably also from its ability to 
offer these young men the possibility to go abroad to see new countries and 
learn new trades – an offer that the more ambitious and adventurous among 
them found difficult to resist. The party’s ability to provide such attractive 
benefits depended on its charismatic leader, Djibo Bakary, who had long-
established contacts with the French communist party and had managed to build 
up a network of contacts in the Eastern bloc. 
His reliance on Eastern-bloc aid brought Sawaba’s violent bid for power 
squarely within a Cold-War ambit. As discussed below, Eastern European 
countries, the Soviet Union and especially communist China provided the party 
with political and military support. In fact, for the People’s Republic of China, 
assisting Sawaba’s revolt represented its first violent attempt to gain a foothold 
in West Africa. This in itself was not unique, since the Eastern bloc was, at the 
time, aiding nationalist parties and liberation movements in various Sub-Saharan 
countries, especially those still under colonial or settler suzerainty. However, for 
the communist bloc, Niger represented an attractive prize. While economically 
weak, the country was suspected, by the early 1960s, of having important 
deposits of uranium, one of the most strategic mineral resources of the Cold 
War. Secondly, the country was strategically located in West Africa between the 
region’s would-be superpower – Nigeria – and Algeria, France’s former 
mainstay that had also been its first nuclear testing ground. Thirdly, since 
Niger’s political leadership was closely allied to President Houphouët-Boigny of 
Ivory Coast – France’s staunchest and most anti-communist ally – a successful 
Sawaba takeover in Niger would have dealt a severe blow to the interests of 
France, the Western world and its African allies. Conversely, part of Sawaba’s 
failure to topple Niger’s government also stemmed from this Cold War context, 
as it led the French to defend their interests in Niger by trying to thwart 
Sawaba’s invasion plans. 
The Cold War context of Sawaba’s insurrection also accounted for another – 
astonishing – aspect of this story, namely the unfounded optimism with which 
the party’s leadership went about its business. As argued in the last section of 
this chapter, this may have been tied to an understudied dimension of Marxist-
inspired liberation ideologies, which involve a degree of romanticism about 
revolutionary struggle that can easily blur one’s view of reality. 
The principal cause for failure stemmed from Sawaba’s lack of domestic 
support. As will be shown, the party did not really have the backing of the Hausa 
peasantry, something which substantially weakened its internal support base that 
could, in practice, only sustain a ramshackle coalition of diverse interests 
between its leadership and the rank and file. That Sawaba drew at least some of 
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its backing from Hausa and non-Hausa youths could not compensate for the lack 
of support of the Hausa populace and may well have dissipated its strength in a 
political system that was partly affected by regional fault lines. This weakness 
may have been reinforced by the fact that the party’s rank and file was probably 
driven more by a mixture of personal aspirations and pragmatic opportunism 
than ethnic jealousies or revolutionary zeal per se. This assortment of 
motivations linked up with what was probably the main driving force behind 
Djibo Bakary’s decision to instigate an insurrection – a long-standing personal 
feud with, and the desire to capture power from, his main political adversary. 
However, this assessment can only be tentative since data on the motivations of 
the individual actors are still sketchy, particularly those of Sawaba’s rank and 
file. Further research is needed to gain a deeper understanding of what drove 
these men to their deaths or imprisonment. 
Lastly, in trying to reconstruct the exact trajectories that the Sawabists 
followed before they met their fate, this chapter touches on two other external 
dimensions – one which today would probably be portrayed as a typical example 
of globalization, and the other involving a striking resemblance to the subversive 
political networks marking the regional context of some of West Africa’s 
contemporary conflicts. Thus, the prelude of the rebellion took Sawaba activists 
to the far corners of the world, visiting, studying and training in Eastern Europe, 
the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, Chinese cities like Peking and Nanking, Cuba 
and, possibly, North Korea. Moreover, in the run-up to the insurrection, Sawaba 
activists spread throughout North and West Africa, keeping in touch with each 




A note on sources 
 
Before tracing the revolt’s background, planning, execution and aftermath, and 
providing a tentative interpretation of its internal and external features, a few 
words are needed on the sources on which this reconstruction is based. The 
reconstruction of Sawaba’s insurrection is hindered by a dearth of sources, 
especially primary source material. The sources at hand consist mainly of 
secondary documents such as newspaper reports and journalistic articles, which 
do not cite sources and are partly based on interviews by Western journalists 
with Sawabists caught after the revolt. 
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Figure 9.1  ‘The theory of firing a gun’. A page from the exercise book allegedly 
found on écolier terroriste Hassane Djibo who was taught in French by North 
Vietnamese instructors in Nanking.  
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One should be careful in interpreting such evidence, as it was usually 
obtained in the presence of government officials.2 These interviews, 
nevertheless, contain a wealth of information about the planning and execution 
of the invasion. The same is true for a speech given by Camille Aliali, Niger’s 
Foreign Minister, at the extraordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers 
in Lagos in June 1965, where the complicity of other West African countries in 
the insurrection was discussed. All these sources contain illustrative material 
such as photocopies of maps with the invasion plans and notes written in the 
personal notebooks of Sawaba guerrillas, which Niger’s government claimed 
were found on activists when they were arrested (Figure 9.1). In addition to 
notebooks, maps and invasion plans, they also included ideological tracts of a 
Marxist-Maoist nature and texts of oaths that activists swore to the Sawaba 
cause.3 
                                                 
2 The interview conducted by Wolfgang Bretholz (National Zeitung, Bern) with 
incarcerated Sawabists was reprinted in Fraternité Hebdo of 14 May 1965, the organ of 
the ruling party in Ivory Coast, an ally of Niger’s government. Entitled ‘Les Camps de 
Sofia, Nankin et Accra en Ont Fait un Tueur’, it was conducted in the presence of the 
Assistant Director of Niger’s Sûreté. Handcuffs were taken off during the interview. 
While treatment of the Sawabists was harsh, Bretholz’s interviewees said they were not 
maltreated but that they had been sentenced to death or might face the death penalty and 
that they did not know whether they would be pardoned. In the second part of the 
interview (reprinted in Fraternité Hebdo, 21 May 1965, as ‘Comment N’Krumah et Ses 
Amis Communistes Transforment de Jeunes Africains en Tueurs’) other Sawabists 
denounced Djibo Bakary’s ‘criminal policy’. Another journalist, J.P. Ruttiman, 
mentioned complaints over insufficient or poor food. He also noted that, at one moment 
in his interview, the Director of the Bureau of Coordination in the President’s Office, 
former French colonial governor Colombani, walked out and that the prisoners did not 
retract any statements. However, this interview took place in 1967 when the atmosphere 
in Niger had become more relaxed. Yet, this is an interesting source as it contains a 
description of a discussion between leadership and rank and file and their 
disagreements. Ruttiman also mentions that Ousmane Dan Galadima, the Sawabist who 
supervised the invasion in 1964, refused to sign the protocols of his interrogation, 
accusing government officials of twisting his words: J.P. Ruttiman, ‘Le Président 
Hamani Diori Nous Déclare: “Djibo Bakary ne Constitue pas Actuellement un Danger 
pour Nous, Mais...”’, Afrique Nouvelle, 1035 (8-13 June 1967). 
3 See Bretholz, ‘Les Camps de Sofia, Nankin et Accra’ and ‘Comment N’Krumah et Ses 
Amis Communistes’, and an interview by Randolph Braumann, ‘So Bildet China 
Mörder aus’, Rheinischer Merkur, 18 (30 April 1965), 14. This was reprinted in French 
in Fraternité Hebdo of 28 May, 4 June and 11 June 1965 as ‘Avec les Tueurs de la 
SAWABA’. Journalists were astonished that the Sawabists were caught with this 
material. Aliali’s OAU speech was reprinted in Fraternité Hebdo of 2, 9 and 16 July 
1965 as ‘Le Contentieux Nigéro-Ghanéen’. 
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While this material should not be interpreted at face value,4 it seems unlikely, 
in view of the amount and wealth of detail, that it was all fabricated by 
Sawaba’s enemies. Much of it fits into a pattern of what is known about militant 
nationalism and movements of kindred organizations in other African states. 
Hence, it enables us to establish a picture of the patterns and meaning of the 
revolt when compared to other material, such as documentary sources retrieved 
from the National Archives of Ghana,5 whose government supported the 
invasion. Admittedly, the picture remains incomplete, notably with regard to the 
motivations of Sawaba’s foot soldiers. Djibo Bakary himself never publicly 




‘Thorez’ – The prehistory to exile 
 
In the 1950s, Djibo Bakary was a rising star in public life in Niger. The son of a 
Zerma chief from the west of the country, and of low birth, Djibo was brought 
up in the central town of Tahoua where he learned Hausa. He was a cousin of 
Hamani Diori, and for some time also his friend, until the two fell out. 
Nicknamed ‘Thorez’,7 Djibo became a charismatic nationalist, who would soon 
                                                 
4 Thus Bretholz’s interviews were clearly arranged by the governments of Ivory Coast 
and Niger. See ‘Les Camps de Sofia, Nankin et Accra’. Other journalists, like Jean-
Pierre Morillon and Gilbert Comte, were openly anti-communist and sympathetic 
towards Niger’s government, dubbing the Sawabists as terrorists. Georges Chaffard 
wrote a chapter containing the most detailed account of the insurrection in Les Carnets 
Secrets de la Décolonisation, vol. 2, (Paris, 1965), 269-332. While being less partisan 
and clearly having had access to some of the material mentioned above, Chaffard did 
not cite his sources. According to Finn Fuglestad, Chaffard was ‘brilliant but not always 
accurate’. F. Fuglestad, ‘Djibo Bakary, The French, and the Referendum of 1958 in 
Niger’, Journal of African History, 14, 2 (1973), 313 n. 1. Also his A History of Niger 
1850-1960 (Cambridge, 1983). 
5 Cited as ‘GNA’. An early secondary source that sheds light on this dimension is W.S. 
Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New 
State (Princeton, 1969). 
6 His autobiography ends in 1960 and in an interview at the end of the book, he evaded 
the issue. D. Bakary, Silence! On Décolonise ... Itinéraire Politique et Syndical d’un 
Militant Africain (Paris, 1992), 291. In an interview with J.R. de Benoist, he also 
stopped short of discussing political developments after 1960. ‘Djibo Bakary Parle’, 
Politique Africaine, 38 (June 1990), 98-110. 
7 After Maurice Thorez, leader of the French communist party, PCF. 
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antagonize the colonial administration with his militant rhetoric.8 He was an 
active trade unionist in emerging urban areas, organizing strikes that resulted in 
substantial salary increases for urban wage earners. Backed by his close alliance 
with the French communist party and trade-union federation, Djibo was 
independent of the colonial administration and soon considered a major 
troublemaker. He tried, with some success, to penetrate traditional youth 
movements, women’s organizations and crafts guilds, and built up some support 
among groundnut farmers in the west of the country. 
Until the mid 1950s, however, Djibo’s power base did not add up to an 
electoral majority. By 1956 this was in sight when his party, the Union 
Démocratique Nigérienne, merged with another political group that enjoyed 
backing in Hausaland, including that of many Sarkis or canton chiefs. Moreover, 
the ambitious Djibo decided to break with the communists, as association with a 
communist party was an electoral liability not only because of the hostility of the 
colonial administration but also in the face of attempts to gain a foothold in the 
more traditionally oriented Hausa areas. 
The Hausas generally resented the domination of the Zerma and Songhai in 
Diori’s PPN and the country’s civil service, especially as Hausa groundnut 
production contributed the largest share to the national income. While half of 
Djibo’s most prominent lieutenants came from other West African countries, his 
party was mainly staffed with Hausas, notably young, urban trade unionists who 
had, by the early 1960s, left the countryside and could help to spread the party 
message. Nevertheless, his followers now made for strange bedfellows. Besides 
the trade unionists, Djibo’s most faithful allies were local traders and followers 
of the Tijaniyya brotherhood, economically active people who opposed the 
traditional order represented by the party’s other allies, the Sarkis, against whom 
Djibo had been agitating at an earlier stage in his career. Moreover, the extent of 
his influence among the Hausa peasantry remained limited. 
Notwithstanding this shaky alliance, the new party managed to win the 
legislative elections of 1957, after which Djibo was appointed government 
leader acting under the supervision of the French colonial governor. The 
victorious party changed its name to Sawaba, a Hausa word variously translated 
as ‘freedom’, ‘independence’, or ‘tranquillity’. Tranquil was it not to be, 
however, since the French pushed through constitutional reforms allowing them 
to retain considerable influence over their African territories, even after their 
eventual independence. Djibo found it hard to accept this constitutional scenario, 
perhaps in part because of Sawaba’s ideological tenets – which involved 
                                                 
8 This section is based on Fuglestad, History of Niger, and ‘Djibo Bakary, The French, 
and the Referendum of 1958 in Niger’; Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets; and S. Decalo, 
Historical Dictionary of Niger (Lanham, MD & London, 1997). 
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relatively militant nationalist rhetoric and Pan-Africanist sentiments – and 
because he may have wanted the full command of state machinery to consolidate 
his fragile power base. While this made him oppose the plans, the French 
exerted heavy pressure on the population, including the chiefly class in 
Hausaland, to approve their reforms in a referendum. Consequently, an 
overwhelming majority of the electorate voted in favour of the reforms, even in 
the capital Niamey and the Hausa east. Djibo had to resign as government 
leader. When the PPN gained a majority in subsequent legislative elections, 
Hamani Diori succeeded Djibo in office. 
Thus, Sawaba was abandoned by most of Hausaland’s chiefs and peasants. In 
addition, it was now confronted by a hostile government intent on eliminating 
the party as an effective opposition force. In February 1959 Djibo left the 
country for Dakar, Senegal. Six months later, Diori’s government banned 
Sawaba, accusing it of colluding with foreign forces and planning subversion. In 
June 1960, eighteen Sawabists, including Abdoulaye Mamani, Adamou Sekou 
and Issaka Koke, were arrested on conspiracy charges. In September, barely a 
month after Niger had acceded to independence, sentence was passed, with 
Mamani facing the heaviest penalty – two years’ imprisonment – and Djibo 
Bakary and Ousmane Dan Galadima, Sawaba’s Assistant Secretary-General, 
being sentenced in absentia. Although Mamani and other detainees were 
subsequently pardoned and reintegrated in the administration, Sawaba had been 
dealt a painful blow. 
The political significance of this was more than mere electoral defeat. In 
Niger’s traditional political cultures, including that of Hausaland, the position of 
the chiefly leader depended on his ability to muster ‘force’ or command ‘luck’ 
(Hausa: nasara k’arfi or arzika), which in turn depended on his relationship with 
the invisible world of deities that formed the ultimate sanctification of political 
rule. Evidence of the ruler’s favour with the divine beings could be his success 
in battle, good rains and harvests or, more generally, a flourishing political 
career.9 This political world-view provided Nigerien politics with a hard edge 
that rewards success and, if need be, ruthlessness but penalizes weakness and the 
decline of political fortune. The banning of Sawaba, therefore, showed to 
Niger’s electorate that its ‘luck’ was up and that it did not deserve further 
support. 
In contrast, Diori’s party managed to capture the highest office in the land, 
lead the country to independence and maintain vital relations with the French. In 
order to confront potential challenges, the country was governed by a 
triumvirate, made up of President Diori, Boubou Hama, the Chairman of the 
National Assembly, and Diamballa Yansambou Maïga, the Minister of the 
                                                 
9 This interpretation is based on Fuglestad, History of Niger, passim.  
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Interior. Maïga was its most powerful member and also represented the 
leadership’s ruthless core. Together with the uncompromising Hama, who was 
detested by segments of Niamey’s population, this enabled Diori to present the 
regime’s more benign and forgiving image.10 Yet Sawaba still enjoyed some 
support among the younger generation, the economically active, those aspiring 
to higher social status, and residents in the urban environment of Niamey. 
 
 
External and internal preparations 
 
In September 1959, Djibo relocated to Bamako in Mali where the atmosphere 
was more in tune with Sawaba’s militant posturing than that in Dakar. The 
headquarters of Mali’s ruling party in the eastern city of Gao served as a 
mailbox for Djibo and Sawaba’s underground leadership in Niger. Djibo was 
allowed to broadcast once a week on Radio Bamako and, in possession of a 
Malian passport, travelled to the Ghanaian capital Accra where he established a 
section of Sawaba among the local community of Nigeriens. Many were 
regional traders or people who had fallen out with Diori’s government. Djibo 
asked John Tettegah, leader of the Ghana-financed All-African Trade Union 
Federation for financial support, while trade unionists in Nigeria were asked to 
facilitate contacts with the Hausa communities living along the border with 
Niger.11 
Ghana, however, proved to be Djibo’s best regional source of support. Its 
president and fervent Pan-Africanist, Kwame Nkrumah, tried to spread his 
ideological tenets throughout Africa. The Nkrumah government invited 
liberation movements from countries still under white domination to establish 
groups in Ghana, but extended this hospitality also to nationals from 
independent African states whose regimes did not share Nkrumah’s political 
convictions.12 To assist its political allies, the Ghanaian government had 
established a Bureau of African Affairs (BAA), which developed into a semi-
autonomous nerve-centre for clandestine operations in other African states.13 
Consequently, Djibo got in touch with Nkrumah and asked for training facilities 
                                                 
10 G. Comte, ‘Les Principaux Dirigeants Nigériens: Un Triumvirat Surprenant’, Europe-
France-Outremer, 430 (November 1965), 16-20, and Decalo, Historical Dictionary of 
Niger, 157 & 201. 
11 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 307. 
12 Details in Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy; I.W. Zartman, International Relations 
in the New Africa (Englewood Cliffs, 1966); and K. van Walraven, Dreams of Power: 
The Role of the Organization of African Unity in the Politics of Africa 1963-1993 
(Aldershot, 1999), Chapters 3-4.  
13 Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 107 & 222-26. 
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for guerrillas who he hoped to send to Niger at some time in the future. At least 
in ideological respects, the two men had roughly similar, or potentially 
compatible, interests. The close friendship of the Diori government with 
President Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast, Nkrumah’s principal rival, 
facilitated the establishment of political relations with the Sawaba leader.14 
Thus, Djibo opened a bank account in Accra, fed by local Nigerien traders and 
the BAA.15 
Djibo also established contact with the Algerian government, Morocco, the 
People’s Republic of China and North Vietnam. There are not many details 
available about how Djibo achieved this, although Sawaba later established 
military training camps in several of these countries. Djibo may have met with 
Ben Bella in Oujda in Algeria in 1962,16 while in January of that year he had a 
meeting with the chairman of the East German Afro-Asian Solidarity 
Committee, Eggebrecht, in East Berlin. The Sawaba leader was promised arms 
in return for future repayment and preferential prospecting of Niger’s sub-soil 
resources, once Djibo came to power.17 The year before, Salle Dan Koulou, a 
member of Sawaba’s political bureau, was sent with a delegation to a Marxist-
inspired youth festival in Helsinki where he got in touch with eight Nigeriens 
from the Soviet Union. They impressed him with stories about insurgency 
training in the Eastern bloc, which Dan Koulou reported to Djibo.18 
By 1962, Sawaba’s section in Ghana had built up some influence with the 
government.19 The party had to maintain a lower profile in Mali, as the 
government there was prepared to turn a blind eye to Sawaba’s presence but still 
wanted to improve its own ties with France. Moreover, Ardaly Daouda, a 
Sawabist responsible for youth matters, was assassinated in Bamako in May 
                                                 
14 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 307, who wrote that Nkrumah was one of Djibo’s 
friends. Thompson (Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 245-46) denies this, however. It appears 
that they met each other in April 1964 to discuss events in Niger. See Nkrumah’s 
Subversion in Africa: Documentary Evidence of Nkrumah’s Interference in the Affairs 
of Other African States (Ministry of Information: Accra, n.d.), 39. R.A. Higgot 
(‘Colonial Origins and Environmental Influences on the Foreign Relations of a West 
African Land-Locked State: The Case of Niger’, PhD thesis, University of Birmingham 
(1979), 306, n. 93) speaks of a personal allowance for Djibo by the BAA of ₤1,500 a 
year as of 1962. 
15 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 309.  
16 J.P. Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’, Est et Ouest, 342 (16-31 
May 1965), 22. 
17 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 307-8. An obvious reference to uranium, the presence 
of which was already suspected. 
18 Le Monde, 4 February 1965, and G. Comte, ‘An Assassination that Failed’, National 
Review: A Journal of Fact and Opinion, 7 (New York, 15 June 1965), 509-10. 
19 An example is given by Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 366. 
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1962, possibly as a result of an argument with Djibo over money and women, 
after which Sawaba’s leader relocated to Accra.20 
The cadres necessary for an onslaught on the Diori regime were recruited as 
early as 1961.21 Sawaba emissaries, disguised as itinerant marabouts or traders, 
travelled through Niger and contacted youngsters who, as Chaffard described, 
were promised scholarships and the chance to study abroad. Possibly some three 
hundred men were persuaded to leave for Bamako, which served as the point of 
rendez-vous before they travelled on to their educational destinations. These 
destinations consisted, however, of a network of camps spread across West and 
North Africa and beyond, whose principal goal was military training and 
political indoctrination. The Bamako office was manned by Salou Damana, who 
had had trade-union education and military training in Guinea-Conakry and 
Morocco. He was charged with welcoming recruits and maintaining relations 
with foreign embassies. He was assisted by Issaka Koke, who had fled Niger 
after his pardon and worked as an employee of a French technical assistance 
scheme in the Malian capital.22 
After Bamako, some activists were sent to North Africa where Sawaba was 
allowed to use a camp belonging to the Algerian FLN (Front de Libération 
Nationale) in Kibdani in the north-east of Morocco, and later a camp in Marnia 
in the Oran region of Algeria itself. Sawaba’s Assistant Secretary-General, Dan 
Galadima, had already been based in the Moroccan capital Rabat for some time. 
When Algeria became independent, he left for Accra, the Kibdani camp was 
closed, and Sawaba opened an office in Algiers. This was headed by Abdoulaye 
Mamani, who had again fallen out with Diori and fled to Bamako to escape re-
arrest. Besides maintaining control over the recruits in Marnia, Tiaret and at a 
school in Algiers, Mamani had the task of purchasing arms and dispatching them 
to Ghana.23 One Louis Bourges, described as a métis and transporter based in the 
Saharan town of Tamanrasset, was charged with the relevant liaison duties.24 
According to Aboubakar Oumarou,25 the Algerian camps were meant for  
 
                                                 
20 For the few details available, see Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 308-9. 
21 Comte, ‘An Assassination that Failed’, 510. 
22 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 310. 
23 The school was the Ecole des Transmissions d’Alger. Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 
309. Chaffard gives May 1961 as the date for Mamani’s escape. For details, see the 
necrology in West Africa, 28 June-4 July 1993, which claims 1962 was the year of his 
flight to Bamako.  
24 Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’. 
25 A chauffeur for the municipality of Niamey when Djibo Bakary was in power. Later 
he gave evidence on the Sawaba rebellion. Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du 
SAWABA’. 
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political-military training of the middle cadres. In December 1962, 52 Nigeriens 
travelled there and were integrated in the Algerian armed forces.26  
Sawaba’s prospective force commanders first made an astonishing itinerary 
throughout the Eastern bloc. Some, like Hassane Djibo,27 waited for seven 
months in Accra before travelling on by plane, via Dakar and Prague, to the 
Bulgarian capital Sofia. At a trade-union school there, he was taught about 
Marxism-Leninism, the workers’ movement, trade unionism and 
industrialization, before heading back – via the Black Sea resort of Varna – to 
Accra. Others, like Boubakar Djingaré, travelled from Bamako to Accra and 
then on to Moscow. Here he and ten other Nigeriens followed an eight-month 
training course at a trade-union institution before returning to Ghana.28 Then 
they flew to the People’s Republic of China or North Vietnam. For example, 
Hassane Djibo and another companion were taken by a Sawaba official, 
Issoufou Gado, to Cairo and then flew on to Karachi, Rangoon and Peking. 
There, they took a train to Nanking.29 Another Sawabist, Djibo Seyni,30 took a 
more difficult route. In the autumn of 1962 he and another compatriot flew from 
Accra to Prague, where they stayed for two days before taking the train to 
Moscow. There they were met by an official from the North Vietnamese 
embassy. Three days later, they took the trans-Siberia railway to Peking and 
then, again by train, went on to Hanoi, where they were received by three other 
Nigeriens who had flown to Vietnam the week before. The five of them then 
went on to the Ecole Nationale Militaire at Son Tay, located on the Red River, 
36 km northwest of Hanoi.31 
In China, trainers and translators helped to teach the Nigeriens, in addition to 
the tenets of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, a variety of military skills, such as 
how to handle a rifle (Figure 9.1), make bombs, commit acts of sabotage, 
ambush troops and organize coups d’état.32 Some of the training took place in 
                                                 
26 One other Sawabist who travelled to Marnia was Yacouba Dari, a companion of 
Aboubakar Oumarou, who was based there until September 1963. ibid. and Comte, ‘An 
Assassination that Failed’, 510. 
27 An agricultural teacher. Bretholz, ‘Les Camps de Sofia, Nankin et Accra’. 
28 Djingaré was a 26-year-old mason from Niamey. Braumann, ‘Avec les Tueurs de la 
SAWABA’. 
29 Bretholz, ‘Les Camps de Sofia, Nankin et Accra’. 
30 A nurse by profession. Bretholz, ‘Comment N’Krumah et Ses Amis Communistes’. 
31 Ibid. and Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 311. 
32 Hassane Djibo claimed that military training was only theoretical and that his 
instructors did not allow them to carry arms. However, he had been condemned to death 
and may have had an interest in playing down his training. Bretholz, ‘Les Camps de 
Sofia, Nankin et Accra’. Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 311, claimed Sawabists were 
trained at an exercise ground fifteen km outside Nanking.  
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the so-called School of the Chinese Revolution.33 All in all, the training lasted 
three months.34 While in Nanking the Nigeriens were only in the company of 
compatriots or other Africans, but in North Vietnam they met thousands of other 
trainees, mostly Vietnamese, but also other foreigners.35 Training there consisted 
of indoctrination and guerrilla warfare and took eight to nine months.36 In total, 
some thirty Nigeriens received such training, either in Nanking or Son Tay.37 
Then came the return journey to West Africa, usually along the same route that 
had taken them to the Far East. Djibo Seyni, for example, arrived back in Accra 
in May 1963 and, according to him, was personally welcomed by Bakary. Seyni 
and his men were then taken to Mampong, north of Kumasi.38 
While the Nanking contingent represented Sawaba’s force commanders,39 
Mampong and other Ghanaian camps trained the party’s foot soldiers. The other 
camps where Sawabists would have received training were at Half-Assini, Axim 
and Konongo-Odumassi near Syniani.40 If it is true that Sawaba’s total force 
amounted to some 300 men, of which roughly one third41 were middle and 
higher cadres receiving training in Algeria and the Eastern bloc, then the 
Ghanaian camps could have instructed some 200 Sawabists. Their training 
involved military skills, details of which were published later by the government 
that toppled Nkrumah’s regime. Some of the instructors may have been Russian, 
                                                 
33 Bretholz, ‘Les Camps de Sofia, Nankin et Accra’. Boubakar Djingaré spoke of a big 
school on the outskirts of the city. Braumann, ‘Avec les Tueurs de la SAWABA’. 
34 Braumann, ‘Avec les Tueurs de la SAWABA’ and Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 
311. Comte, ‘An Assassination that Failed’, 509, suggests ten months on the basis of the 
trainees’ personal notebooks. 
35 Son Tay was a major North Vietnamese training site, later to be attacked by US 
Special Operations Forces in an effort to free POWs (1970). See the website 
www.sontayraider.com 
36 Bretholz, ‘Les Camps de Sofia, Nankin et Accra’ and ‘Comment N’Krumah et Ses 
Amis communistes’ and Braumann, ‘Avec les Tueurs de la SAWABA’. 
37 Later, some people received training in Cuba. See Fraternité Hebdo, 9 July 1965. 
38 Bretholz, ‘Comment N’Krumah et Ses Amis Communistes’. 
39 Morillon gives the following names: Dodo Hamballi, Baro Alfari, Dandouna 
Aboubakar, Sékou Béri, Harouna Bonkourou, Issoufou Bambaro, Souley Gori, Tini (or 
Tine) Malélé, Joseph Akouët and Issoufou Gaho (Gado?), former announcer on Radio 
Moscow’s Hausa service. Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’. To 
this list should be added Salle Dan Koulou, who flew to Peking with eight or ten 
activists. Le Monde, 4 February 1965 and Comte, ‘An Assassination that Failed’, 510. 
40 Aliali, ‘Le Contentieux Nigéro-Ghanéen’. Obenemasi should also be included in this 
list, where, for example, 50 Nigeriens were enrolled in May 1965. See Nkrumah’s 
Subversion in Africa, 20. 
41 Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’. 
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as Chinese trainers arrived only in October 1964 – the very month of the 
invasion of Niger.42 
In Niger itself, meanwhile, political tensions were rising. In November 1963 
the Diori government became embroiled in a row with neighbouring Dahomey 
over the sacking of Dahomeans from Niger’s public services and a related 
frontier dispute. Domestic opposition came from trade unionists whose 
organization had been banned; students who accused the educated elite of 
having monopolized power; and Touareg resenting Zerma-Songhai domination 
of the country’s political system. Moreover, in the eyes of the government not 
all sections of the army could be relied upon. Two top functionaries, both of 
them Peul, were considered suspect: Zodi Ikiah, the Minister of Defence, and 
Captain Hassan Diallo, an officer in charge of a heavy weapons unit who staged 
a failed mutiny to get redress for various grievances. Both men, who were 
interned in December 1963, were approached by Sawaba in a bid to secure their 
support against the Diori regime.43 About that time, the first clandestine 
operation was undertaken inside Niger, either to assist in a military mutiny or to 
contact different opposition figures. The infiltrator, possibly the Son Tay trainee 
Djibo Seyni, then returned to Accra and is said to have reported negatively on 
the country’s revolutionary potential.44 
Efforts to reconcile Niger’s government with its arch enemy came to nothing, 
at least in part because of Djibo’s own intransigence. Things turned uglier with 
Sawaba sympathizers being beaten up in Zinder and Tahoua and a terrible 
incident near the town of Maradi, which was in the heart of Hausaland and seen 
as Djibo’s fief:45 in May 1964 Sawaba sympathizers attacked Boubou Hama and 
Maïga, the two government hardliners, in the course of a local meeting, after 
which police moved in and some forty people, the majority of whom were not 
Sawabists, were thrown in prison. In the overcrowded conditions, 21 of them, 
many youngsters, died of asphyxiation. The incident scared people in the Hausa 
east and it was reported that several took refuge in Nigeria.46 Gendarmes also 
killed Alzouma Koussanga, a vet and one of Sawaba’s most respected internal 
leaders. He was arrested in Maradi on 2 September, as were other people, and 
                                                 
42 Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa, 6-7. 
43 Details in Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 313-16; Fuglestad, History of Niger, 160; 
Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Niger, 118 & 332; and Afrique Nouvelle, 898 (23-29 
October 1964). 
44 Bretholz, ‘Comment N’Krumah et Ses Amis Communistes’. 
45 See Afrique Nouvelle, 898 (23-29 October 1964). 
46 It was said that Sawaba recruited among these people. Afrique Nouvelle, 898 (23-29 
October 1964). 
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died in detention shortly afterwards.47 Another leading Sawabist, Adamou 
Sekou, was again taken into custody and incarcerated in a camp in the Sahara. 
Boubacar Ali Diallo, a cabinet minister and former Sawaba militant, was 
dismissed on suspicion of complicity in the mutiny of the previous year.48 
These events may have convinced Djibo that discontent was widespread, 
while most reports of clandestine Sawabists suggested that the party’s guerrillas 
would be received with open arms. Yet, while the toughening of the government 
did much to escalate the conflict, Djibo had possibly all along entertained the 
option of violent action. At roughly the time that the Maradi detainees died, 
Djibo, Abdoulaye Mamani and Ousmane Dan Galadima met in Porto Novo in 
Dahomey to review operational planning.49 Moreover, by the summer of 1964 
military training had been under way for well over two years. 
The cadres assembled in Accra. In September, Sawaba’s main forces were 
dispatched in small groups to Porto Novo, which could be used as a forward base 
as the Dahomean authorities, embroiled in their own dispute with Diori, were 
prepared to turn a blind eye and facilitate operations. Sawaba issued several 
communiqués and declarations, broadcast throughout West Africa, in which it 
announced that it would liberate Niger from the Diori regime, which was deemed 
‘anti-national’ and neo-colonialist, imposed as it had been by ‘foreign’ (French) 






Some guerrillas would infiltrate via Dahomey, some through Upper Volta and 
others through Nigeria, assisted by activists of the Nigerian Labour Party. 
Operations were directed by Dan Galadima, Sawaba’s Chief of Staff, in Porto 
Novo, where weapons would be distributed. Units would first attack Niger’s 
border posts and then try to occupy the urban and rural centres with the help, it 
was imagined, of the local population. At a given signal, the internal Sawaba 
party would rise in support of the guerrillas.51 Djibo had ordered Salle Dan 
Koulou, Nanking trainee and member of Sawaba’s political bureau, to dispatch 
                                                 
47 Koussanga had been director of political affairs in Djibo’s government. The most 
detailed description of this sad tale is in Afrique Nouvelle, 895 (2-8 October 1964). 
48 West Africa, 17 October 1964. 
49 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 321. 
50 Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 366; Marchés Tropicaux, 7 November 1964; 
Afrique Nouvelle, 898 (23-29 October 1964); Fraternité Hebdo, 9 July 1965; Chaffard, 
Les Carnets Secrets, 321-24. 
51 Comte, ‘An Assassination that Failed’, 510.  
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the guerrillas in small groups, spread along the entire length of the frontier with 
Upper Volta, Dahomey and Nigeria. The units would consist of ten to fifteen 
men each. Those in the western sector (Téra to Doutchi) were to attack the 
towns of Téra, Gotheye, Say and Gaya, those in the central sector Birni 
N’Konni, Tahoua and Madarounfa, and the eastern commandos would take on 
Matameye, Bosso and N’guigmi (see Map).52 
Those in the western sectors were to attack first.53 One unit would establish 
contact in the Téra region with a group from Upper Volta, led by Nanking 
trainee Tini Malélé, and incite the local Peul and bellas (people of slave origin) 
to revolt. According to documents found later on this group, it had to isolate 
Téra by cutting communications, attack the administrative post of Bankilaré, 
capture all arms, and together with the Upper Volta group charge on Kokoro, 
take Téra and march on to Dargol. If it were not possible to occupy Téra, the 
guerrillas would try and capture its armaments, create confusion and start 
harassing ‘the whole of the Songhai region’. Both the population of the Téra 
canton and the people of Diagourou would be incited to rebel.54  
During the final stages of the operation, commandos would try and capture 
the capital. They would have to destroy its water supply, cut electricity and 
telephone lines, silence Radio Niger and destroy the Shell and Mobil Oil depots. 
Other commandos would occupy the airport, ammunition depots and the police 
headquarters. Across the country, market towns had a special importance, as 
they represented sources of people, ideas and money.55 Money taken from 
border and administrative posts would be used for the cause and detainees freed 
from prison recruited for the struggle.56 Once the various sectors had been 
occupied, Dan Koulou had to impose the villayas system – the autonomous 
military regions that had been used by the FLN in Algeria in its struggle against 
the French.57 Some commandos were given orders to take certain people hostage 
or liquidate members of the government, such as the hated Minister of the  
                                                 
52 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 321-24. At the OAU, Niger’s foreign minister referred 
to a western sector, a southern one (Birni N’Konni to N’Guigmi) and a northern sector 
(Filingué-Tahoua to Agadez), led by Abdoulaye Mamani and Issoufou Dambaro. Text 
in Fraternité Hebdo, 9 July 1965. 
53 See undated letter of Djibo Bakary to Salle Dan Koulou, printed in Fraternité Hebdo, 
9 July 1965. 
54 Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’ and Le Monde, 4 February 
1965. 
55 G. Comte, ‘Les Carnets de Nankin’, Est et Ouest, 357 (16-28 February 1966). 
56 Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’ and Le Monde, 4 February 
1965. 
57 Djibo Bakary to Salle Dan Koulou, undated. Malélé’s instructions, of Chinese origin, 
also spoke of creating ‘free zones’. Comte, ‘An Assassination that Failed’, 510. 
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Interior Maïga, on whose comings and goings domestic activists had collected  
valuable information.58 All commandos were ordered to hide their documents 
before crossing into Niger. Djibo himself was to monitor infiltrations from Porto 
Novo.59 
The central units were to be led by men from Sawaba’s highest political 
hierarchy, as this region had provided considerable electoral support in the past. 
Hence, Dandouna Aboubakar, a former trade unionist and Nanking trainee, 
would attack Birni N’Konni, Salle Dan Koulou would take on Madarounfa and, 
if all went well, Maradi; and, further to the north, Abdou Iddi, a Son Tay trainee 
and political commissar attached to the guerrilla force,60 would infiltrate Djibo’s 
political stronghold at Tahoua.61 
Thus, eight commando units went on the attack between late September and 
mid-October.62 On 27 and 28 September attacks took place in the west of 
Niger.63 Between Say and the border with Upper Volta, one guerrilla unit was 
intercepted, five commandos were caught and their leader, Hassane Moussa, was 
killed. According to documents found on Moussa, the unit had planned to attack 
Say and incite a rebellion. It had infiltrated as two groups, one from Malanville 
in Dahomey and the other from Upper Volta.64 Further west, a group of fourteen 
men, who had to establish contact with Tini Malélé’s unit from Upper Volta, 
penetrated the Téra region.65 On 2 October 1964, seven commandos, who had 
infiltrated from Upper Volta, attacked Gotheye in the west, 70 kilometres 
northeast of Niamey. They shot several PPN cadres and were heading for Téra 
when they were nearly all captured by armed villagers.66 On 4 October, Salle 
                                                 
58 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 324. 
59 Djibo Bakary to Salle Dan Koulou, undated. 
60 According to Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’, Iddi had been 
trained in Nanking from 22 November 1962 to 4 May 1963, together with Yacouba 
Issa, Amadou Boube, Souley Chaibou and Amadou Chaibou. 
61 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 321-25. One of these central units also included Dodo 
Hamballi, a Sawaba delegate from Zinder-Magaria. Aliali, ‘Le Contentieux Nigéro-
Ghanéen’. 
62 Chafard, Les Carnets Secrets, 325. Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du 
SAWABA’, speaks of nine. A few more could be counted, depending on what 
constituted a commando unit. 
63 Marchés Tropicaux, 7 November 1964. 
64 Aliali, ‘Le Contentieux Nigéro-Ghanéen’. 
65 Le Monde, 4 February 1965. The fourteen could have been the total of both groups or 
Malélé’s group alone, as Comte (‘An Assassination that Failed’, 510) speaks of 
Malélé’s ‘fourteen armed partisans’. 
66 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 324. According to Niger’s foreign minister (note 61), 
at least four groups penetrated from Upper Volta, and at least three from the town of 
Sokofé. 
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Dan Koulou’s unit struck the post of Madarounfa in the central sector. It 
consisted of twelve men assembled in Kano, Nigeria, at the end of September 
and was armed with grenades and machine guns.67 In the eastern sector, Sawaba 
commandos overran the customs post of Bosso near N’Guigmi around 8 
October,68 wounding several people, killing two officials, and capturing ten old 
rifles. They were led by a former chief, Katchella Abba Kaya, and assisted by 
smugglers active along the border with Chad and Nigeria. This unit had 
originally assembled in Kano, left the city on 14 September and regrouped at the 
Komadougou River before the attack.69 Matameye, in the Hausa heartland, was 
attacked on 12 October by guerrillas armed with grenades and automatic rifles 
who had also left Kano, two days earlier.70 Other guerrillas charged on 
Magaria71 and Ayorou, having crossed the border from Watagouna in Mali.72 
On 11 or 13 October, Dandouna Aboubakar and ten guerrillas, who had 
entered Niger from the Nigerian city of Sokoto, attacked Dosso in the Birni 
N’Konni region and shot the schoolmaster of Dibissou, who was considered to 
be pro-government. On this party more information is known thanks to an 
interview by a Western journalist with one of its captured members, Boubakar 
Djingaré, and the speech by Niger’s foreign minister at the OAU. Djingaré’s 
group left Sokoto on 14 September, travelling to the towns of Amaroua and 
Gamdawa, before it crossed into Niger and headed for the town of Illela. The 
commandos hid in the fields for several days, avoiding all contact with villages, 
while their commander and political commissar went off during the evening. 
Then the unit attacked a land rover and drove through the night to a homestead 
where a peasant had prepared a hideout.73 
The Bosso operation mentioned above could be interpreted as the high-water 
mark of Sawaba’s invasion, as all other attacks backfired, were prevented or 
could not be followed up with forward action. Thus, one group was discovered 
by peasants only three days after having entered the western sector from 
Malanville. While eleven managed to escape, three were caught, among them 
                                                 
67 Le Monde, 4 February 1965; Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’; 
and Aliali, ‘Le Contentieux Nigéro-Ghanéen’. 
68 The dates vary from 7 to 10 October. Marchés Tropicaux (7 November 1964) gives 
the night of 8 to 9 October. Le Monde (4 February 1965) mentions 8 October. 
69 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 325; Le Monde, 4 February 1965; Afrique Nouvelle, 
898 (23-29 October 1964); and Aliali (‘Le Contentieux Nigéro-Ghanéen’) who said the 
two victims in Bosso were a nurse, shot in his dispensary, and a defenceless peasant. 
70 Le Monde, 4 February 1965, and Aliali, ‘Le Contentieux Nigéro-Ghanéen’. 
71 Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’. 
72 Aliali, ‘Le Contentieux Nigéro-Ghanéen’. 
73 Braumann, ‘Avec les Tueurs de la SAWABA’; Le Monde, 4 February 1965; Marchés 
Tropicaux, 7 November 1964; and Aliali, ‘Le Contentieux Nigéro-Ghanéen’. 
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Djibo Seyni.74 From Madarounfa, Salle Dan Koulou was supposed to press on to 
Maradi. On 6 October, however, the Nanking trainee brought about his capture 
by accidentally firing his gun, killing one of his men and in the process 
betraying the unit’s presence.75 He was shot – possibly by a woman76 – wounded 
and arrested with at least three other guerrillas.77 Four of his comrades were 
killed. Djingaré’s unit could not use the hideout prepared by their peasant friend, 
who feared that villagers would find out since the guerrillas had arrived during 
daylight. They were forced to take cover in the bush and after a few days left in 
the direction from which they had originally stolen the land rover. This time the 
men attacked a farmstead but peasants caught up with them.78 They were all 
arrested, including Djingaré, a certain ‘Momon’79 and one Amadou Diop. The 
unit’s leader, Dandouna Aboubakar, was interrogated and beaten to death with 
sticks.80 
Several others hid in the countryside, demoralized by the hostile reception 
they had received and at a loss as to what to do.81 On 6 November at Gaya on 
the Dahomean border, one guerrilla was attacked by dogs and caught by 
peasants.82 Another was killed near Tahoua on 28 November.83 His commander, 
Abdou Iddi, had shot himself in the mouth but was captured alive.84 Possibly 
around mid-October, security officers arrested Dodo Hamballi, Nanking 
Sawabist from Zinder-Magaria, while he was trying to smuggle weapons into 
the country.85 On 24 October, the group of fourteen men in the Téra region, 
                                                 
74 Bretholz, ‘Comment N’Krumah et Ses Amis Communistes’. 
75 Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’.  
76 According to Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 325. No other information is known on 
this. 
77 West Africa, 31 October 1964, and Marchés Tropicaux, 7 November 1964. 
78 Braumann, ‘Avec les Tueurs de la SAWABA’. 
79 Possibly trained in Algeria. The people from this group, who according to Djingaré 
constituted seven in total, not ten, would also have included Balkara (or Boukara) 
Abdou, a Nanking trainee, and one Djibo Hassan (not to be confused with Hassane 
Djibo, who was in a unit that went from Malanville to Botou in Upper Volta and from 
there into Niger [Bretholz, ‘Les Camps de Sofia, Nankin et Accra’]). These events were 
reconstructed from Braumann, ‘Avec les Tueurs de la Sawaba’ and the original article 
in the Rheinischer Merkur, ‘So Bildet China Mörder Aus’. 
80 According to Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, this took place on 9 October, which does 
not tally with other sources that give 11 or 13 October as the date of his attack. 
81 See, for example, Bretholz, ‘Les Camps de Sofia, Nankin et Accra’. 
82 Possibly he was part of the unit that penetrated from Malanville on 6 November. 
Aliali, ‘Le Contentieux Nigéro-Ghanéen’. 
83 Perhaps from the unit that crossed the frontier with Mali at Ménéka. Ibid. 
84 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 325. 
85 Comte, ‘Les Carnets de Nankin’. 
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possibly led by Tini Malélé, was intercepted by PPN youth cadres.86 Six days 
later, another group of five, who were armed with Russian machine guns and 
had been ordered to take the administrative post of Say, was captured, among 
them Hassane Djibo, the trainee from Nanking and Sofia.87 Commandos who 
attacked Bosso were caught some three weeks later. Numerous others hid in the 
countryside for weeks, chased and starved, before being taken prisoner. Of some 
240 guerrillas, 136 were captured and a dozen or so killed, while the others fled 





The response of Niger’s authorities was swift and harsh. They benefited from 
the fact that they knew well in advance that the guerrillas were coming. Despite 
its elaborate planning, Sawaba had trumpeted its attack with communiqués 
broadcast throughout the region. French intelligence had also kept a close watch 
on Sawaba activities and French officers still occupied various positions in 
Niger’s security structures. Colombani, the former colonial governor, held a 
high-level position as Director of the Bureau of the Presidency, being 
responsible for state security.89 In other West African countries, too, French 
officers continued to man high-security posts, maintaining a network of political 
and military informers. French troops were stationed in Dahomey and in several 
cities in Niger right up until the autumn of 1964.90 
West African governments were equally aware of the guerrilla training 
courses taking place in Ghanaian camps and even had their own spies there. 
West African diplomats posted in Accra were, according to a scholar who 
interviewed them in the mid-1960s, well informed about what was going on.91 
The governments organized in the so-called Entente, at least those of Niger, 
Ivory Coast and Upper Volta, also kept in close touch with each other. 
Moreover, Nkrumah’s government constituted a ramshackle administration with 
                                                 
86 Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’; Le Monde, 4 February 1965; 
and Comte, ‘An Assassination that Failed’, 510. 
87 Comte, ‘Les Carnets de Nankin’. 
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various interests and self-serving institutions led by loose-tongued militants – a 
situation not conducive to discretion.  
Thus warned, Niger’s police, military and PPN cadres could mobilize the 
population, a fact that explains the hostile reception the guerrillas received from 
the peasantry. Those guerrillas that survived the encounters were quickly 
rounded up and incarcerated while awaiting trial. On the night of Monday 12 
October, the State Security Court sentenced to death the four Sawabists who had 
been caught the week before at Madarounfa, including the wounded Salle Dan 
Koulou. The following evening they were shot, watched by a crowd of 10,000 
people who had been incited to assemble by a police loudspeaker touring the 
capital. The body of Dandouna Aboubakar, who had been lynched by peasants 
in Birni N’Konni, was exhibited in front of the new police headquarters and lay 
there for three days.92 This move was clearly meant to intimidate the 
government’s enemies and anyone sympathizing with the Sawaba cause.93 After 
this, a special court was constituted to try the remaining guerrillas. Although 
they would be allowed defence counsel, there would be no right of appeal, not 
even in the event of the death penalty being handed down.94 In total, eleven 
Sawabists were sentenced to death but only ten were executed as the eleventh 
was lucky enough to be forgotten about and left in his cell. He was subsequently 
pardoned.95 
The political consequences of Sawaba’s autumn attack reverberated across 
the region as Diori’s government waged a diplomatic offensive to improve its 
strategic position. Undaunted, Djibo issued a hollow statement in Accra 
announcing that his men had inflicted ‘severe losses’ on Niger’s government and 
appealing to the population to take up arms.96 The party’s leadership had, in fact, 
envisaged a second invasion for June or July 1965, which would apparently be 
supervised by the Ghanaians and members of the Nigerian Labour Party.97 In a 
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letter from Sawaba’s leadership to the BAA, it was observed that the party 
would gain political power through ‘the revolution’, which would lead to a 
social and economic transformation that would give it ‘complete revolutionary 
victory’. In order to achieve this, however, the leadership intended to change 
strategy.98 With still some 250 to 300 Sawabists in Ghanaian training camps,99 
the training of recruits continued, now with the help of Chinese instructors. 
Ghana Airways was requested to transport men and armaments to Cotonou, 
Dahomey, and the BAA was asked to follow up on its recent gift of ₤25,000 and 
resolve the party’s financial difficulties.100 
Things did not run smoothly, however, as the catastrophe of the autumn had 
led to tension inside Sawaba’s leadership. In February 1965, Dan Galadima and 
Abdoulaye Mamani101 met with Djibo in Accra and criticized him for 
overestimating Sawaba’s popularity and underestimating the strength of Diori’s 
regime. According to them, he had also purchased arms of poor quality, declined 
to make full use of training possibilities and failed to boost the guerrillas’ 
morale. In addition, they accused him of spending too much time and money on 
women.102 The upshot of these exchanges was that Issaka Koke, the Sawabist 




The second invasion never took place as it was superseded by a dramatic turn of 
events. At 9 a.m. on Tuesday 13 April 1965, during celebrations to mark the 
Muslim Tabaski festival, a Sawabist threw a grenade at President Diori who was 
present at a gathering of more than 20,000 people in the Grand Mosque in 
Niamey, on the very spot of the 1964 executions. As the American grenade fell  
                                                 
98 Some activists dispatched to China and Cuba for instruction had returned to Accra 
under the guidance of one Salifou Abubakar. Excerpts of a letter dated 31 October 
1964, in Fraternité Hebdo, 9 July 1965. 
99 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 326. 
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foreign minister had claimed, or he had escaped. 
102 It was rumoured that he sent a monthly cheque of 50,000 FCFA to a woman in 
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326. Ruttiman, ‘Le Président Hamani Diori Nous Déclare’, speaks of a ‘beautiful red 
sports car’. The personal use of funds was also echoed in a letter of the Ghanaian 
ambassador in Niger to his government in Accra. GNA: N/POL/66, Ambassador B.L. 
Placca to H.E. M.F. Dei-Anang, African Affairs Secretariat, 16 April 1965. 
103 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 326 and G. Chaffard, ‘La Subversion au Niger en 
1965’, France-Eurafrique, 190 (December 1967), 36. 
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Amadou Diop, who tried to assassinate President Diori  
Copyright: Rheinischer Merkur, 18 (30 April 1965), 14 
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three rows behind him, Diori – who was in the middle of praying – escaped 
injury. The projectile exploded and killed a four-year-old boy. Three Nigeriens 
were wounded, including a member of parliament, as well as three members of a 
Malian basketball team on tour in Niger. Having missed Diori, the Sawabist 
threw a second grenade but it failed to explode.104 
According to the Ghanaian ambassador to Niamey, the perpetrator, who went by 
the name of Amadou Diop, had missed his target as he ‘was probably both 
nervous and incapable of stretching his arms fully’.105 The ambassador cabled to 
his superiors in Accra: 
 
From all accounts, Amadou Diop is the suicide type and was fully aware and 
prepared for the consequences of throwing the bomb at President Diori at such an 
open space and from among such a crowd as at the prayer congregation. He bit his 
finger hard in expression of disappointment at not getting his target and that sums 
him up.106 
 
The assassin was immediately arrested and stripped naked. A pistol was found 
on him. The crowds were asked through a microphone to remain calm and the 
area was quickly cordoned off. With the exception of the president and the chief 
Imam, everyone, including cabinet ministers, was searched before being allowed 
to leave the grounds. Three more people were found carrying grenades and 
pistols.107 Interrogation of the assassin yielded several details about his 
background and planning: Diop was from the Zinder region, his mother was 
Nigerien and his father Senegalese. In the early 1960s he had left Niger to 
                                                 
104 GNA: NC/47, From Ghana Embassy Niamey to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Accra 
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Placca to H.E. M.F. Dei-Anang, African Affairs Secretariat, 14 April 1965; Fraternité 
Hebdo, 9 July 1965; Comte, ‘An Assassination that Failed’, 509; and ‘L’Attentat 
Manqué contre M. Hamani Diori est Vivement Ressenti en Afrique’, Afrique Nouvelle, 
924 (22-28 April 1965). Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 327, speaks of five wounded. 
GNA: NC/47, From Ghanaian Embassy Niamey to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Accra 
(for Dei-Anang from Placca), 14 April 1965 speaks of 7 wounded. A Malian, 
Mohamedine Sylla, was slightly wounded in the face. The Malian arbiter, Alioune 
Diouf, sustained a serious injury to his liver. ‘L’Attentat Manqué contre M. Hamani 
Diori’. 
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receive training abroad. The places and countries mentioned included Marnia, 
Nanking, Son Tay and North Korea.108 In China, he had served as an announcer 
for Radio Peking’s Hausa service. From China, he had returned to Ghana and 
received training in Mampong.109 
As mentioned above, he was arrested in October 1964 when peasants caught 
up with his unit and beat to death its leader, Dandouna Aboubakar, whose body 
was exhibited to the public. Diop, who was described as Dandouna’s assistant,110 
had been imprisoned but escaped. He had fled to Nigeria111 and returned to 
Accra and was said to have sworn to avenge his comrades and their families 
who, Sawaba’s leaders would have told him, had all been shot.112 Diop left 
Accra again either on 19 March or some date in February, travelled to Kano and 
entered Niger at the beginning of April 1965.113 He arrived in Niamey with a 
party of eight men, who were carrying twelve grenades each. He would have 
admitted that he got the grenades from an undisclosed source in Nigeria and that 
he had originally planned to kill the president at the airport upon his return from 
a visit to Abidjan.114 Since Diop originated from the Zinder area, few people in 
the capital knew him, which could explain why he had been able to come so 
close to the president.115 Ghana’s ambassador wrote that activists had planned to 
throw grenades simultaneously in all the district capitals during Tabaski prayer 
meetings. Underground activists would have openly warned the government that 
‘their number was great’ and that these actions would continue.116 
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Aftermath 
 
By now the high point in Sawaba’s war had come and gone and Niger’s 
government lashed out at its enemies. Disagreements in the country’s 
triumvirate healed overnight, with Maïga and Boubou Hama uniting behind the 
president. On 25 May, the State Security Court sentenced five people to death, 
including Zodi Ikiah, the former Minister of Defence, and Captain Hassan 
Diallo, who had both been interned for the 1963 mutiny. Fourteen people were 
sentenced to life imprisonment, 28 received sentences ranging from four to 
fifteen years, while eighteen others were acquitted.117 
While the government was busy rounding up activists, it also turned its 
attention to foreign quarters. It consulted Western governments, mended 
relations with Mali and Dahomey and improved diplomatic ties with Nigeria, 
where Sawabists were arrested after a shooting incident in Kano.118 Ghana was 
isolated through action in the OAU. When Ben Bella was toppled in a coup 
d’état in Algeria in June 1965, Sawabists there were ordered to desist from 
political activity in return for their right of abode.119 
More dramatic were the consequences of Nkrumah’s fall from power the year 
after. With Nkrumah toppled, Sawaba’s men were effectively trapped inside 
Ghana, and only a few leading figures and assistants managed to escape to the 
country’s Eastern-bloc embassies.120 In April 1966 some sixty121 handcuffed 
Sawabists were deported to Niamey.122 Dan Galadima, Sawaba’s Chief of Staff, 
was arrested in January 1967.123 Djibo had found temporary solace in Accra’s 
Bulgarian mission. Later, he managed to leave Ghana. At the end of 1966, he 
                                                                                                                       
Ministry of the Interior said that ‘similar terrorist activities’ had taken place in many 
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Bulletin, (1966), 485. 
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was spotted in Algiers, where Abdoulaye Mamani was still based, and early in 
1967 he left for Dar es Salaam.124  
The party’s staff base had shrunk from some 300-400 people to possibly 
twenty or thirty diehards.125 As of 1966, the government began to pardon 
individual activists, while others were thrown in prison.126 The partial 
clampdown continued until the end of the decade. In 1969 the authorities 
organized trials in Tahoua and Agadez, following which 134 people were sent to 
prison for several years. Two years later, 53 of these were pardoned, Amadou 
Diop’s death penalty was commuted to life imprisonment and 81 life sentences 
were reduced to twenty years’ imprisonment.127  
 
 
‘In search of estuaries’: Interpretation and conclusion 
 
At the time of the invasion, outside observers saw Sawaba’s actions as evidence 
of a regional-ethnic conflict, placing east against west and the northern Touareg 
against the south, with the Zerma majority in government accused of favouring 
the ethnic communities in the west.128 The government’s inner circle was staffed 
mainly by Zermas and Songhais, while Sawaba specifically aimed to incite 
members of minority ethnic groups (Peul) or people of inferior social status 
(bellas). Moreover, there were tensions in the Hausa east in the run-up to the 
invasion. There were, however, also other cleavages that cross-cut with these 
ethnic-regional divisions and, hence, reduced their salience. The government 
had also adopted a profoundly conciliatory attitude towards Hausaland’s chiefly 
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class,129 something that weakened Sawaba’s power base in an area where its 
support among the peasantry had never been strong. 
In this context, Sawaba agitation was less the expression of regional-ethnic 
deprivation than a revolt against the social-generational dimensions of the status 
quo in Hausaland itself, a dimension that was also much broader than the 
cultural confines of Hausaland. It should be noted, for example, that while many 
activists appear to have been Hausa, several others were not. Some even 
originated from other countries. That generational tensions130 were present in 
Nigerien politics in the 1960s had already been noted by contemporary 
observers, who referred specifically to people in their twenties and thirties, with 
relatively high levels of education and good incomes.131 Looking at Sawaba, one 
may conclude that this conflict was much wider and involved youths of lower 
status. While the available evidence is sketchy, one is struck by the relatively 
humble backgrounds of the guerrillas. They had had vocational training and 
included masons, nurses, gardeners and agricultural instructors with an 
aspiration for higher education. Most claimed they were lured with promises of 
schooling abroad, an assertion not so extraordinary in view of Djibo’s 
international linkages. In their confessions, the arrested guerrillas presented 
themselves as eager, gullible youngsters who were intent on going abroad and 
enrolling in foreign institutions, but were kept dangling until they found 
themselves in Eastern bloc schools studying, not their desired courses in 
agriculture or architecture, but Marxism-Leninism and agit-prop. Once they 
discovered the true reasons behind their travels, they could not opt out and 
return home since they were financially dependent on their benefactors. Hence, 
they decided to make the best of it.132 
This should not be dismissed outright as disingenuous. In Niger and West 
Africa generally, then as now, one could not lightly dismiss an offer of a free 
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education or foreign travel.133 Moreover, a contemporary eyewitness who went 
to study medicine in the People’s Republic of China reveals the 
misunderstanding over the true purpose of these journeys to Eastern bloc 
countries. Many had expected they would be taught a profession but to their 
surprise faced sub-standard courses and political indoctrination.134 This part of 
the testimony may, therefore, well have been genuine. 
Whether this was also true for the journeys to the Far East, which were 
follow-up visits for the higher cadre, is open to question. The testimonies 
consistently pleaded ignorance about military training as the objective of the 
long road to China, although they are not unambiguous.135 Perhaps the guerrillas 
were just blessed with a mixture of personal aspirations, ideological conviction 
and pragmatic opportunism. In addition, Sawaba’s recruits were subjected to 
what appeared to be stiff discipline. The Instructions et Directives aux Missions 
found on arrested commandos included what Gilbert Comte quoted as ‘Le 
Serment du Combattant Nigérien’, which provided en detail the text and 
procedure of the oath of allegiance that the party’s soldiers had to swear before 
Sawaba’s flag. It came down to an unconditional subjection to the party’s 
leadership, on pain of unspecified sanction – more or less along the lines of the 
dogma of democratic centralism as practised in communist parties.136 Several of 
the arrested guerrillas complained about the discipline they had been subjected 
to.137 One Sawabist, who had provided his leaders with intelligence running 
counter to party analysis, was treated as a ‘counter-revolutionary’ and 
‘defeatist’. He was reminded of his oath and the money spent on his 
education.138 
Nevertheless, their oath of allegiance and military preparations made it clear 
that the Sawabists had come to kill if necessary. Hope of attaining good 
domestic positions as veterans of a victorious army and a certain eagerness to 
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return home after several years in exile may have given them the final push. In 
addition, some activists, like Amadou Diop, may have been motivated by 
revenge for what the authorities did to fellow activists. However, as Diop had 
come straight from Accra and arrived in Niamey with several other men, the 
attempt on Diori may have been approved at the highest level of the party.139 
That the act was carried out during a Muslim prayer meeting – a fact met with 
contempt among Nigeriens, including Sawaba sympathizers140 – shows the 
degree of hostility between Sawaba and Niger’s political leadership. 
Ideological justification for this violence was provided by a cocktail of 
militant African nationalism, Marxism-Leninism and Maoist beliefs. Many of 
the party’s arguments centred on the degree of foreign (French) influence in 
Niger, which had ‘imposed’ a ‘neo-colonial’ regime on its people. In addition, 
Maoist and Marxist-Leninist doctrines suggested an analysis of Niger’s political 
situation involving a systematic justification for Sawaba’s war as historically 
correct. That these ideological perspectives were unsuited to the circumstances 
pertaining in Niger is beside the point, as the evidence suggests that the Chinese 
and, perhaps, Sawaba’s officers, thought they were appropriate. When Niger’s 
authorities arrested the party’s commandos, they found various documents and 
personal notebooks faithfully reproducing Maoist and Marxist beliefs. The 
notebooks, embellished with dragons and pagodas, contained heavy ideological 
prose copying Chinese views on such outlandish issues as Peking’s quarrels with 
the Soviet Union and Soviet-Yugoslav ‘revisionism’. Alternatively, the 
handwritten notes reproduced more stereotypical and unsuitable tenets as the 
vanguard role of the proletariat and the identification of imperialism, feudalism 
and the ‘comprador bourgeoisie’ as the targets of Sawaba’s revolutionaries. The 
fact that these notes were found alongside gris-gris (personal fetishes meant for 
protection against evil) shows that if these Marxist beliefs had been internalized 
by the party’s fighters, they were at least part of a blend of discursive 
imaginations of reality.141 
In the past, doubts have been expressed about the sincerity of Djibo Bakary’s 
own ideological convictions.142 They involved a militant-nationalist 
interpretation of Niger’s situation, the portrayal of Diori’s presidency as a neo-
colonial usurpation of power and occasional references to Pan-Africanist tenets. 
Djibo’s militancy may also have been fed by the experience of exile. The 
sketchy evidence on his behaviour during this period paints a picture of an 
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uncompromising personality, driven perhaps by revenge, and intent on capturing 
power from a rival politician by capitalizing on resentment among certain 
sections of Niger’s population. Even after the disastrous autumn invasions, 
Djibo did not show any signs of soul-searching or regret about the fate of his 
foot soldiers. 
Sawaba’s analysis failed to grasp the weakness of its support base, which 
was flawed as a result of its inability to penetrate the Hausa peasantry, hold the 
backing of the Sarkis and gain a significant foothold in the west of the country. 
The rising tensions in Hausaland in 1963-1964 did not, therefore, provide 
enough ground for a successful revolt. Exile may have militated against realistic 
appraisal. While the party possessed a network of internal spies, its command 
structures precluded careful processing of information. In many cases, informers 
tried to please the leadership by feeding it data confirming its analysis,143 while 
contrary intelligence was ignored.144 
Despite meticulous planning the execution of the invasion was marred by 
mistakes and inattention to detail. Many of the rank and file had not been paid 
for some time and before reaching the targeted entry points in Niger had to fend 
for themselves.145 Weaponry was insufficient146 and a possibly fatal error in 
strategy was the decision to attack along the entire length of the southern and 
western frontiers. While this required considerable capacity for planning and 
coordination, it also diminished the strike power of Sawaba’s forces. The 
decision to attack the western sector first, possibly induced by a desire to reach 
the capital as quickly as possible, diminished any chance of success even 
further, as it was here that the party enjoyed least support. 
Nevertheless, guerrillas and leadership appeared to display shocking 
confidence in the run-up to the invasion. The guerrillas had expected to be 
received with open arms as they would have been told by the party leadership 
that they could expect a triumphant welcome.147 This anticipation may have 
been part of the reason why Sawaba thought that it could gain control of a 
country the size of Niger with only 240 men at its disposal. It could also explain 
why guerrillas claimed that they had been fooled by their leaders. The rank and 
file were possibly convinced that things were about to change. Hence, they were 
eager to leave their Ghanaian base camps.148 This psychology of coming home, 
which nobody who has experienced years of exile can fail to ignore, may have 
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driven them to their death.149 This could additionally explain why many of the 
leaders headed the units that infiltrated the country and why no one bothered to 
destroy their papers as they had been instructed to.150 
The actions of Djibo himself appeared influenced by naive – even romantic 
– conceptions about the nature of revolutionary struggle. While he was 
instructing Salle Dan Koulou to introduce the villayas system of autonomous 
military regions, Sawaba’s commandos would not have had the possibility of 
applying a system that drew its inspiration from a very different war of 
liberation. Coupled to his years in exile, this romantic touch led to what 
Ghana’s ambassador in Niamey deemed Djibo’s dependence on miracles rather 
than political organization.151 Yet a belief in miracles may have been a crucial 
part of Sawaba’s inspiration. In fact, it had that romantic dimension in common 
with most Marxist-inspired ideologies of revolutionary liberation, which were 
fashionable at the time and stipulated the need for a radical break with the past, 
but with little precise guidance. Colburn notes, in this respect, that Marxism-
Leninism amounts, or amounted, more to a mentalité than a coherent plan of 
government, which explains the millenarian ideas of revolutionary elites and 
their ignorance of how to realize society’s Herculean transformation.152 Imbued 
by such conceptions, revolutionaries could be seen as the mystics of the 
twentieth century.153 Consequently, as the nationalist agitator trained in the best 
French communist tradition, Djibo could be considered representative of or at 
least affected by a dreamy framework that urged him to walk inexorably 
towards the attainment of his burning desire – the capturing of political 
power.154 
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The same buoyancy characterized the Chinese, whose leader Mao Tse Tung 
enjoyed exceptional prestige among Third World revolutionaries.155 In the same 
decade as the Cultural Revolution, the creation of chaos would have fitted into 
Chinese ideas of revolutionary advancement through conflict and destruction.156 
If Sawaba’s commanders presented, at best, a rather mediocre picture of the 
party’s intellectual forces, this was certainly matched by what appeared to be a 
complete misunderstanding by the Chinese of African conditions – something 
that can partly explain their spectacular failure.157 Thus, instructions found on 
Sawabists assured the latter that the revolutionary potential of the rural areas 
was ‘inexhaustible’, as the peasant masses were eager to shake off the forces of 
imperialist domination. Inspired by their own history, China’s instructors 
advised Sawaba’s men to conquer the countryside and then encircle the cities; 
and just in case the situation should turn against them, they were advised to 
establish support bases in mountainous regions or areas with ‘networks of rivers, 
lakes and estuaries’.158 
Predictably, once on the ground, the Sawabists appeared to be at a complete 
loss159 and were destroyed as much by their own ineptitude as by the 
government’s forces. Shooting each other by accident and stumbling on hostile 
peasants, they were beaten to death in a lynching party or captured alive, 
stripped naked in public and shot by firing squads and their bodies laid to rot in 
desecration. They met total humiliation, demonstrating for all to see that 
Sawaba’s luck had run out. If contemporary observers found the idea of 
desperate guerrillas seeking refuge in Niger’s imaginary estuaries amusing,160 
later authors were perhaps closer to the truth when judging it pitiful.161 This, of 
course, does not transform Sawaba’s men into moral champions. They were, 
after all, carrying arms, shot their enemies and wounded others. While this is not 
the place to engage in conjecture, one wonders what would have happened if the 
invasion had turned into a rout of the PPN. War is ignorant of romance. 
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